Our paper presents an agent-based simulation environment for task scheduling in a distributed computer systems (grid). The scheduler enables the simultaneous allocation of resources like CPU time, communication bandwidth, volatile and non-volatile memory while employing a combinatorial resource allocation mechanism. The resource allocation is performed by an iterative combinatorial auction in which proxy-bidding agents try to acquire their desired resource allocation profiles with respect to limited monetary budget endowments. To achieve an efficient bidding process, the auctioneer provides resource price information to the bidding agents. The calculation of the resource prices in a combinatorial auction is not trivial, especially if the the bid bundles exhibit complementarities or substitutionalities. We propose an approximate pricing mechanism using shadow prices from a linear programming formulation for this purpose. The efficiency of the shadow price-based allocation mechanism is tested in the context of a closed loop grid system in which the agents can use monetary units rewarded for the resources they provide to the system for the acquisition of complementary capacity. Two types of proxy-bidding agents are compared in terms of efficiency (received units of resources, time until bid acceptance) within this scenario: An aggressive bidding agent with intense rising bids and a smooth bidding agent with slow increasing bids.
INTRODUCTION
We present an agent-based simulation environment for resource allocation in a distributed computer system that employs shadow prices as an information entity to effectivize the allocation process. Our environment enables the simulation of a mechanism for the simultaneous allocation of resources like CPU time, communication bandwidth, volatile and non-volatile memory in the distributed computer system. In contrast to traditional grid allocation approaches, our allocation process considers production complementarities and substitutionalities for these resources making the resulting resource usage much more efficient. The central scheduling instance of our system is comparable to an auctioneer that performs an iterative combinatorial auction in which proxy-agents try to acquire the resources needed in computational tasks for the provisioning of information services and information production (ISIP) 1 by submitting package bids for the resource combinations. The proxy-agents' willingness-to-pay (W2P) for these bundles is constraint by limited budgets of a virtual currency they are endowed with. The allocation system simulates a closed loop grid economy in which the agents gain monetary units for resources they provide to other grid system participants via auctioneer. The earned virtual currency can be used for the acquisition of complementary resource capacity by submitting combinatorial bids. The simulation environment allows the utilization and benchmarking of different proxybidding strategies in various system load situations. Two main bidding strategies are compared in this paper:
• An aggressive bidding agent that submits combinatorial bids while trying to achieve quick bid acceptance by using a fast inclining bid pricing strategy.
• A smooth bidding agent that submits multiple bid bundles to the auctioneer waiting for bid acceptance of some of the alternative bids, while increastomized stock chart data or the broadcast of a public event to viewers via TCP/IP protocol.
ing the bid prices only slowly.
The bidding strategies are compared with respect to their allocation efficiency, that is measured in terms of received resource units per virtual currency unit spend by the agents and time to bid acceptance in the auction process.
COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS FOR RESOURCE ALLOCATION IN DISTRIBUTED COMPUTER SYSTEMS
Various auction protocols have been proposed for resource allocation in distributed computer systems in the last decades. The transfer of economic principles to resource attribution in grid systems, like the price controlled resource allocation (PCRA) 2 used in our scenario enables a flexible implementation of allocation mechanisms in decentralized systems (Buyya et al., 2001) .
Combinatorial auctions are a suitable tool to allocate interdependent resources because they can take their substitutionalities and complementarities into account. The production process for information services in distributed systems comprises an allocation problem with strong complementarities. For example, if an information service, like the provisioning of a video conference service via the web or the offline calculation of distributed database jobs, has to be processed on different computers, acquiring CPU time without obtaining communication network capacity between the computers at the same time, it makes the acquired CPU time worthless. The application of combinatorial auctions for resource allocation in distributed computer systems is still in its infancy despite its excellent applicability to grid computing. In a recent approach ) present a combinatorial auction-based mechanism for resource allocation in a SensorNet testbed where the devices have different capabilities in various combinations. The periodically performed combinatorial sealed-bid auction is implemented within the microeconomic resource allocation system (MIRAGE). The system uses a very simple combinatorial allocation mechanism to achieve sufficient real time performance. MIRAGE users have accounts based on a virtual currency enabling a bartering process for the SensorNet resources. A consequent continuation of this work is the grid computing environment Bellagio by . Each bidder has a budget of a virtual currency for task payment. The assignment 2 The price is used as a control variable for the scheduling mechanism, requests with higher W2P are prioritized. of the required resources to tasks is done by combinatorial second-price auction, which come close to a strategy proof mechanism. In several experiments the system is tested with respect to scalability, efficiency and fairness. Due to the simple greedy algorithm used in this system the efficiency of the resulting resource allocation is not satisfying.
AN AGENT-BASED SIMULATION ENVIRONMENT FOR COMBINATORIAL RESOURCE ALLOCATION
Our combinatorial grid scheduling environment, realized in JADE 3.3, goes beyond the recent approaches in several points:
• The system enables the usage of several winner determination algorithms like simulated annealing, genetic programming, and integer programming methods according to the users' requirements in terms of allocation quality and computation time 3 .
• The simulator provides tools to investigate various bidding behaviors of the proxy agents in the resources acquisition process. We will concentrate on this aspect in this paper.
• The framework can simulate changing resource capacities to test the combinatorial grid scheduler's reaction with respect to allocation efficiency and system stability.
Scenario for a PCRA in a Combinatorial Grid Scheduler
This section gives a brief overview on the resource allocation scenario for ISIP provision used in our work. The scenario includes four resource types:
• Central processing units (CPU) that are mainly responsible for the data processing in the ISIP tasks.
• Volatile memory capacity (MEM) which is necessary to store short term processing data for the central processing units.
• Non-volatile storage capacity (DSK) which is necessary to hold mass data on databases and provide program code for the execution of the ISIP processes.
• Network bandwidth (NET) that is required for data interchange between the grid computer units 4 . The general PCRA scenario used within the combinatorial grid simulator is constructed as follows:
• Task agents (bidders) are engaged in acquiring the resources needed to process the ISIP task in the distributed computer system on behalf of real world clients. They do this by bidding for the required resource combination via the mediating agent.
• A mediating agent (auctioneer) receives the resource bids and calculates an allocation profile for the available resources managed by the resource agents according to the allocation mechanism. After a successful auction process bidders are informed about the acceptance of their bids.
• Resource agents collect information about available resources on their particular host IT systems within a network of distributed computers and provide this information to the market mediator. The resource agents offer the available capacities to the task agents via the mediating agent. In the case of a bid acceptance via auctioneer the acquired resources are reserved for the corresponding winning agent in advance.
Figure 1 depicts the ISIP allocation scenario. Resource agents administrate available MEM, CPU, NET and DSK capacities on their particular host computers systems on the supply side. On the demand side task agents collect the required resource combinations including MEM, CPU, NET and DSK capacity needed to accomplish their production tasks. Between resource and task agents stands a market mediator that allocates the resources employing a combinatorial auction. For the formal representation of the bids a two-dimensional bid-matrix (BM) is used. One dimension of the BM describes the time t ∈ {1, . . . , T } at which the resource is required assume that NET capacity can be managed as one single system resource.
within the request period T 5 . The other dimension r ∈ {1, . . . , R} denotes the resource types MEM, CPU, NET, DSK. The request for a quantity of a individual resource r at time t is then denoted by a matrix element q(r, t). A price p is assigned to each BM expressing the agent's W2P for the resource bundle. In addition to the BM , two other matrix types play a role within our grid simulation framework:
BMstruc. Time Slot
• The allocation matrix (AM) describes the awarded allocation q(r, t) for resources r and time slots t within the following ISIP provision period T .
• The constraint matrix (CM) expresses the maximum quantity q max (r, t) of resource r the auctioneer can assign to the task agents at time t. The maximum possible resource load of the CM represents the aggregated resource availability for the following time slots.
q bmax denotes the maximum resource load that can be requested by a bidder for a single BM element q i,j (r, t). In our matrix instances each entry in a BM is occupied with probability p tso . This means, b i,j = 0 with probability 1 − p tso .
The Combinatorial Scheduling Auction
In the following paragraph the course of the combinatorial grid auction is described in the light of an UML sequence diagram based on the FIPA definition for the English auction (steps are denoted in ) 6 :
1. The auctioneer requests the resource agents to evaluate the available resource capacities and informs the bidders about the bidding terms. Then he announces the start of the auction. Additionally, the auctioneer awards an initial budget to the task agents.
2. Following the auctioneer's call-for-proposal, the task agents create their bids according to the desired resource combination. Bidders compute the associated bid price, dependent on their actual pricing policy, their budget level, and the latest resource prices.
3. The auctioneer receives the bids and calculates the return-maximizing combinatorial allocation. He informs the task agents about bid acceptance/rejection and requests the resource agents to reserve the awarded resources.
4. Resource agents inform the auctioneer about the status of the task execution.
5. The auctioneer propagates task status information to the task agents and debits the bid price for the awarded bids from their accounts, followed by a call-for-proposal for the next round.
6. Task agents can renew their bids in the next round in the case of non-acceptance or non-execution. The agents' bid pricing follows rules defined in the subsequent paragraph.
7. The process is repeated until the auctioneer informs about the end of the auction.
In the following the three crucial elements of the combinatorial grid scheduling system are described in more detail: the budget management mechanism, the combinatorial auctioneer and the task agents' bidding behavior:
The System's Budget Management Mechanism
Each of the task agents a i holds a monetary budget BG i that is initialized with a fixed amount BG ini of monetary units (M U s) at the start of the system. At the beginning of each round k the task agents' budgets are refreshed (see figure 2, 1) with an amount of MUs enabling them to acquire the resource bundles b i,j required for their ISIP provision task. The agents' budget refill can be done in two ways in our grid economy:
• A fixed amount BG inc that is defined by the system user is added to the agents' budgets independently of the production capacity they provide to the grid system. This case, where task agents only behave as consumers, is denoted as an open grid economy. The resource agents which own the resources act independently from the task agents providing only resource availability and resource usage information to the auctioneer. The resource agents are compensated by the auctioneer for the capacity provided proportionate to the auctioneers income Inc acc . • Task and resource agents act as a unit of consumer and producer both owning the resources of their peer system. This means a task and a resource agent reside simultaneously on each peer computer in the grid. The resource agent does the reporting of resource usage and provisioning for the task agent owning the peer computer resources (see figure 2, 1,4) 7 . The agents on the peer computer are compensated for the resources provided to the system. The compensation process is organized by the auctioneer. Starting with the initial budgets BG ini the amount of MUs circulating in the system is kept constant for the closed grid economy.
The accounting of the agents' budgets in the grid system is done by the combinatorial auctioneer (see figure 2, 1,4) .
The Combinatorial Auctioneer
The combinatorial auctioneer does the iterative allocation process in our grid system. For this purpose the auctioneer awaits the bids b i,j that have been submitted by the task agents a i for the current round. The bids that are submitted in the form of BM s are 7 In Figure 1 this implies that resource agent 1 and task agent 1 reside on the same peer computer.
shown in Table 1 and represent the task agents requests q i,j (r, t) for the resources r in a specific quantity q at a particular point of time t. After having received all alternative BM s submitted by the task agents, the auctioneer has to solve the combinatorial auction problem (CAP) which is NP-hard (Parkes and Ungar, 2000; Fujishima et al., 1999) . The CAP is often denoted as the winner determination problem (WDP), according to the traditional auctioneers task of identifying the winner. The formal description of the CAP could be considered as a special variant of the weighted set packing problem (WSPP) (Vries and Vohra, 2001 ) and is formulated as:
pi,j xi,j subject to
qi,j(r, t) xi,j ≤ qmax(r, t), where r ∈ {1, . . . , R}, t ∈ {1, . . . , T } and The goal is to maximize the auctioneers income. q max (r, t) is the maximum capacity of resources at time t available to the auctioneer and B is the set of all bids b i,j . Furthermore, we refer to the set of accepted bids as I + (with I + ⊆ B).
Shadow price calculation
For an efficient bidding process it is necessary to provide preferable exact informations about the actual auctioneer's valuation of the resources to the proxyagents. However it is not possible to calculate unambiguous prices (anonymous prices) for the individual resources in a combinatorial auction due to the nonlinearities in the bidders' valuations (Xia et al., 2004) . In many cases explicit resource prices can only be calculated for each individual bid. (Kwasnica et al., 2005 ) describes a pricing scheme for all individual goods in a combinatorial auction, by approximating the prices in a divisible case based on a linear programming (LP) approach first proposed by (Rassenti et al., 1982) . Like in a similar approach by (Bjorndal and Jornsten, 2001) they use the dual solution of the relaxed WDP is used to calculate the shadow prices (SP). In our simulation model we adopt the dual LP approach of (Kwasnica et al., 2005) including accepted bids as well as rejected bids 8 :
subject to r t qi,j(r, t) · xr,t = pi,j ∀bi,j ∈ I We use the primal solution of the LP problem delivered from open source LP solver LPSOLVE 5.5 9 to the appointment of sets I + and I − . As described above, our matrix has R × T elements, i.e. for every resource r ∈ R there are T time slots we group the results as follows:
In general bid prices are not assumed to be linear in our framework. This means that shadow prices SP cannot be calculated by the auctioneer for each round, i.e. there is no solution of the LP problem, or reduced costs equal zero for a number of bids (Bjorndal and Jornsten, 2001 ). In such cases we rely on an approximate shadow price calculation based on pricing history (H sp ) 10 :
Now we can investigate the market value of a resource unit, while we use the shadow prices and form the sums of each resource r ∈ R and each time slot t ∈ T for all accepted bids:
8 The result of the following formula is denoted as reduced shadow prices. By omitting the rejected bids in the calculation of dual prices the result would be higher (Bjorndal and Jornsten, 2001 ).
9 http://www.geocities.com/lpsolve/ 10 (Xia et al., 2004) propose an iterative price adaption process for those cases to achieve an approximate solution anyway, due to time criticality of our system we stick to the pricing history solution. 
The Task Agents' Bidding Model
The task agents' bidding behavior is determined by two factors:
• At each round o new bids b i,j are generated for each task agent a i . The structure of the new generated BM s varies according to the matrix types defined in section 3.1. The proxy-agents a i have the possibility to submit bids b i,j as exclusively eligible bundles. The eligibility is defined such that m BM s are treated as XOR bids 11 .
• Task agents repeat bidding for rejected bids in the following round while changing the W2P with respect to the actual resource supply/demand situation.
In our simulation environment we use different types of new BM s generated by the task agents 12 . The BM s used in this paper have a structured pattern: bidder agents require resources with the same intensity for a longer period of time (up to t max slots). This results in continuous bids of varying length, that are close to realistic demand structures in distributed ISIP systems.
Based on the resource occupancy q i,j (r, t) in the BM s that are requested by the ISIP provision process, the proxy-agents have to formulate their associated W2P for the bids. Three cases have to be distinguished (see equation 9):
• In the first round no estimation of the prices can be given to the bidders. For this reason bidders formulate the W2P for their first bids with respect the initial budget BG i and their bidding strategy. This is done by calculating a mean bid price that guarantees the proxy bidder's budget to last for the next l rounds if o bids are added in each round.
• In the following rounds the task agents' calculate their W2P for the new submitted bids employing market values for the resources given in equation
is included into the calculation of the initial bids. By setting P ini to e.g. 0.8 task 11 For the definition of OR, XOR and other variants of bid connections within bidding languages see (Nisan, 2005) .
12 See (Schwind et al., 2003) for the BM type definitions.
agents are prompted to submit initial bids slightly lower than resource market or above market level for P ini is e.g. 1.2.
• For the rejected bids task agents' show the following behavior. The actual price for a bid b i,j of task agent a i in round k is calculated by using the market values of the resources derived from the shadow prices of the precedent round. To control the price adaption process an additional price acceleration factor P inc (k) is introduced. At each round the P inc (k) is incremented by a constant ∆P if the bid was not accepted in the last round to accelerate the price adaption process ( Table 2 ). The bidding for rejected bids is repeated for the following production time span t pro for the next l rounds until the bid is accepted, otherwise the bids are discarded. The agents bidding behavior is limited by the task agents' budget. If the agents budget is exhausted no further bids are formulated until the budget is refreshed in the next round k. The bidding behavior of the task agents can be modified by varying parameters like ∆P, o, l and m.
Testing Different Bidding Strategies
In this section we will have a closer look at two different economically motivated bidding strategies defined by the task agents' parameters described above. The bidding strategies evaluated in this paper only differ in ∆P :
• An aggressive bidding agent that submits combinatorial bids while trying to achieve the bid acceptance by using a fast inclining bid pricing strategy. The economic motivation of this behavior can be a proxy agent that bids for the execution of time critical tasks in an ISIP provisioning system. A good example for this is the performance of a video conference in the distributed system. The conference is scheduled for a narrow time window. The proxy agents have to bid for a prompt fulfillment of the resource usage tasks. Therefore it is useful that proxy agents quickly raise their bids to market level.
• A smooth bidding agent that submits multiple bid bundles to the auctioneer waiting for bid acceptance of some of the alternative bids, while increasing the bid prices slowly. The economic rationale for this type of proxy agent strategy can be the fact, that it bids for resources required for the fulfillment of an ISIP task that is not time-critical. An example for this may be the computation of large time consuming database jobs on a distributed system, that have to be done in a very relaxed time window. A plausible strategy for the proxy bidding task agent is then to try to acquire the required resource capacity bundles at low market values with bids with slightly increasing W2P.
For construction of the closed-loop grid economy in our experiments we assumed the same production function for all task agents leading to equal payoff Inc acc /I of the auctioneer's income Inc
The applied strategy was either increasing the ∆P for the rejected bids by a constant 0, 2 as described in Table 2 for the smooth bidding agents or varying the bidding strategy in a range from ∆P = 0, 1 to 1.5 (see Table 3 ) for the aggressive bidding agents. Beginning with one bundle containing three XOR bids in round one, both types of agents generated three additional bids in each further round k. The bids were held and increased by ∆P over a maximum of l = 5 rounds in case of non-acceptance. The pattern of the new generated bids was identical to the structured BM type described in Table 1 (q bmax = 3; p tso = 0, 333; t max = 4). The auctioneer could allocate a maximum load of q max = 8 per resource while T was eight units for the CM . Figure 3 shows the results of the strategy simulations, 100 runs for each ∆P in 0, 1 steps. The aggressive bidder acts competitively against three smooth bidders. In the upper part of Fig. 3 the mean round time until bid acceptance can be seen, whereas the lower part depicts a mean of budget spending per acquired resource unit. For an increasing aggressive agent the mean acceptance timek acc aggr reduces by 0, 25 for ∆P = 0, 4; 0, 5 and 0, 6 compared to the average acceptance timek acc smoo of the smooth bidder (See Table 3 .). While rising ∆P the average acquisition price ∆p per resource unit (over all resource types) increases linear for the aggressive bidder (See Figure 3 lower part. ). As can be seen from Table 3 
CONCLUSION
We presented an agent-based simulation environment for a grid scheduler that enables the simultaneous allocation of resources in a grid-like computer system. Allocation is done by a combinatorial auction in our economically inspired approach where proxy-agents try to acquire optimal resource bundles with respect to limited budgets. The system allows to provide price information for the resources that are needed to perform various information services and information production tasks in the grid. This is done by calculating shadow prices in connection with solving the NP-hard winner determination problem of the combinatorial auction by an integer programing approach. The efficiency of the shadow price-based allocation was tested in a closed loop grid system where the agents can use monetary units rewarded for the resources they provide to the system for the acquisition of complementary capacity. Two types of bidding agents have been compared in terms of efficiency (average resource price payed and waiting time until bid acceptance): An aggressive bidding agent with intense rising bids and a smooth bidding agent using low bid increments. While searching the strategy space by varying the bidding behavior of the aggressive agent from smooth to very aggressive in a competitive environment with multiple smooth bidders, it turns out that there exists a bidding strategy where the trade-off between bid acceptance time and average resource price payed is optimal. Future research will address system behavior in resource failure situations and the question of incentive compatible bidding.
